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Jays hide food caches, steal them from conspecifics and use
tactics to minimize cache theft. Jays are sensitive to the content
of their own caches, retrieving items depending on their
preferences and the perishability of the cached item. Whether
jays impose the same content sensitivity when they steal
caches is less clear. We adapted the ‘cups-and-balls’ magic
routine, creating a cognitive illusion to test whether jays are
sensitive to the (i) content of hidden items and (ii) type of
displacement. Subjects were presented with two conditions in
which hidden food was consistent with their expectations; and
two conditions in which food was manipulated to violate their
expectations by switching their second preferred food for their
preferred food (up-value) or vice versa (de-value). Subjects
readily accepted food when it was consistent with their
expectations but were more likely to re-inspect the baited cup
and alternative cup when their expectations were violated. In
the de-value condition, jays exhibited longer latencies to
consume the food and often rejected it. Dominant subjects
were more likely to reject the food, suggesting that social
factors influence their responses to cognitive illusions. Using
cognitive illusions offers innovative avenues for investigating
the psychological constraints in diverse animal minds.1. Introduction
Jays hide food in different locations for future consumption and
not only remember the location of their own caches but also the
location of caches that belong to other individuals. Jays rely on
observational spatial memory to retrieve their own caches and
to steal the caches of others [1–4]. To protect their caches from
theft, jays employ a range of different cognitive tactics that limit
the observer from obtaining visual or acoustic cues that might
reveal the location of the store [5–7]. For example, jays




2the quality and transfer of visual information to potential thieves [8–10]. Jays also prefer to cache in quiet
substrates to conceal auditory information, particularly when a competitor cannot see the cacher but is
within earshot [11,12]. In instances where a competitor’s sensory access cannot be reduced, cachers
misdirect potential pilferers by making genuine caches in among multiple bluff caches, making it
difficult for an observer to accurately trace the caching event [6].
The cache-protection tactics used by jays have recently been compared with techniques employed by
magicians to prevent spectators from detecting the cause of their magic effects [13]. For instance, jays
manipulate food items within their beaks, akin to the magician’s use of ‘sleight of hand’, to discretely
make genuine caches amidst bluff caches. During caching events, jays also conceal items in their
throat pouch similar to the magician’s use of false pockets [14]. A growing number of studies that use
magic as a framework to investigate the human mind have revealed that magicians capitalize on the
blind spots in our perception and the roadblocks in our cognition [15–22]. Could jays be susceptible
to analogous psychological constraints?
In a recent perspective piece in Science, we advocate the application of magic effects to animal
psychology as an alternative and innovative avenue for investigating the animal mind [23]. It is worth
noting, however, that the use of magic effects has already permeated the methodological paradigms of
comparative psychologists. Specifically, researchers have used violation of expectation paradigms on a
range of taxa including primates [24,25], dolphins [26], dogs [27] and corvids [28], whereby subjects
are presented with both expected and unexpected events. Violations of expectation paradigms are
comparable to magic effects because both aim to evoke surprise in the observer by presenting the
unexpected. However, in these experiments, researchers primarily rely on looking time as a
behavioural measurement, with longer looking times representing ‘surprise’ when expectations are
violated. This single scale measurement makes it difficult to draw cognitive parallels between the
human and animal mind when experiencing the unexpected.
Violation of expectation paradigms has also been adapted to include both positive and negative
surprises whereby bad food is ‘magically’ transformed into good food and vice versa [24,29]. Such
studies have supplemented looking time with other behavioural measurements such as latency to
retrieve the food and likelihood to reject the food. But the current scope of studies has yielded
ambiguous results. For example, Tinklepaugh [24] showed that macaques, Macaca mulatta, only
responded to negative surprises with increased latency to eat the substituted less desirable food. By
contrast, Bräuer & Call [29] found that apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Pongo pygmaeus, Gorilla
gorilla) and dogs, Canis familiaris, react to both positive and negative surprises with increased looking
and smelling behaviour; but the subjects never rejected the less desirable food and latency to retrieve
the food did not differ across expected and unexpected trials [29]. These differing responses could be
attributed to the number of trials within each design, which varied across the studies. Specifically, the
ape and dog subjects received a limited amount of ‘expected’ trials before experiencing an
‘unexpected’ trial, whereas Tinklepaugh’s monkeys received hundreds of expected trials before
experiencing an unexpected trial. The elevated number of trials in the Tinklepaugh study makes it
difficult to determine whether the monkeys were indeed sensitive to the content of the hidden food
and thus surprised by the unexpected or whether they were simply responding to the negative
contrast effect between the expected and unexpected trials. Negative contrast responses have been
demonstrated in a range of species including mammals [30–33], birds [34] and insects [35]. Contrast
effects occur when an animal gains information (through reiterate experiences) to create an
expectation about a reward and this expectation is not met. For example, evidence in rats suggests
that when an expected reward is omitted from a trial they respond with increased aggression [36] and
their stress hormones are activated [37].
To gain a better understanding of whether the animal mind is sensitive to cognitive illusions, subjects
should be presented with magic effects that would deceive a human spectator [23]. Moreover, cognitive
illusions can be amplified if the spectator is given the opportunity to interact with the magician or the
props used in the effect [38]. Although the experience of magic is typically a mental phenomenon, it
has also been referred to as a social phenomenon because experiencing the impossible can be
influenced by the social dynamics between the magician and the members of his audience [39].
Anecdotes from magicians reveal that human spectators exhibit varied responses to magic
performances and that this variation might be linked to social dominance [40]. Specifically, spectators
that have a higher social dominance rank appear to be more likely to react negatively towards a
cognitive illusion. Cache-protection tactics performed by jays can also be described as a social
phenomenon because jays will flexibly change their tactics depending on the observer. For instance,




Figure 1. The baiting procedure for the de-value condition: (1) out of sight of the bird, a piece of cheese (second preferred food
item) is inserted into one of the two cups; (2) both cups are then placed in front of the subject and the bird is presented with the
worm (most preferred food item); (3) a dummy-drop is conducted, whereby the worm is inserted into the cup but instead of
actually dropping it into the cup, it is concealed within the experimenter’s fingers and subsequently withdrawn; (4) both cups





By contrast, jays refrain from applying these cache-protection tactics if they are being watched by their
mate with whom they will share their cache at a later time [6]. Food-caching jays are, thus,
particularly suitable candidates to investigate whether social factors can influence responses to
cognitive illusions in non-human minds.
Here, we apply a magical framework, an adapted version of cups-and-balls,1 to investigate whether
observing Eurasian jays, Garrulus glandarius, are sensitive to cognitive illusions. The cups-and-balls
routine is typically described as a cognitive illusion [41] because it is used to manipulate human
perception and cognition by creating an illusion in which balls ‘magically’ appear and disappear
under the cover of opaque cups [42,43]. In humans, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this well-
known illusion have been extensively studied by psychologists who have aimed at disentangling the
epicentral elements of the experience [41,43,44]. Here, for the first time, we adapt this illusion to
investigate responses in non-human animals. The application of this illusion allowed us to not only
test whether jays are sensitive to the content of hidden items but also whether their responses are
augmented or diminished depending on how the content is changed. We presented jays with two
control conditions in which the hidden food was consistent with their expectations and two
experimental conditions in which the hidden food was manipulated to violate the birds’ expectations.
Manipulation conditions, one which elicited a positive surprise and one which elicited a negative
surprise (figure 1), were achieved by using a magic-switch, a strategy for creating the perception of a
magical effect. We predicted that subjects would react to both positive and negative surprises but1Other variations of this magic routine include ‘Chop Cup’ and the ‘Pea & Shell Game’.
roya
4responses to negative surprises would be stronger. We also measured the social rank of the subjects to
determine whether social dominance influenced the jays’ responses to cognitive illusions. We




We tested the maximum number of jays in our laboratory that would voluntarily participate in the
experiment and maximized trial numbers per subject (i.e. 25 trials per condition) [45,46]. Nine sub-
adult jays (five years old) from a long-term, stable social group of 16 birds participated in this study
from October 2019 to January 2020. However, three jays stopped interacting with the apparatus and
only six jays (four females and two males) completed all training and testing. Birds were housed at
the Sub-Department of Animal Behaviour, University of Cambridge in Madingley, Cambridgeshire,
UK. Housing consisted of an outdoor aviary (20 × 10 × 3 m) with indoor compartments (2 × 1 × 2 m) at
one end. Birds were able to enter the indoor compartments from the aviary via opaque flap doors
(0.5 × 0.5 m), whereby access was controlled by the experimenter. Birds were provided with a
maintenance diet (a mixture of soaked dog biscuits, vegetables, eggs, seeds and fruit) in the outside
aviary and had ad libitum access to water.
2.2. Procedure
To ensure that the jays were mildly hungry and thus, motivated to participate in the food-rewarded
experiments, the maintenance diet was removed from the aviary 1 h prior to testing. Subjects initiated
the daily training and/or testing session on a voluntary basis by entering the open flap doors and
moving into the final indoor compartment, which was reserved as a testing chamber. Inside the
testing chamber, individual subjects were required to sit on a perch in front of a testing platform that
was adjacent to a testing window. The experimenter stood in an adjacent compartment and completed
the training and testing via the testing window.
2.3. Pre-test training
All subjects were first tested in an object permanence experiment comprised of four tasks [47–49] (electronic
supplementary material, table S1), in which performance hinged on understanding that an object continues
to exist even if it can no longer be seen. Subjects were then trained to lift an upside-down cup, which was
fixed with a piece of string (0.4 cm diameter cotton string) to create a handle that the birds could
manipulate using their beaks. Jays were first presented with a worm covered with a clear cup,
providing the birds with a clear view of the food item inside. Training with the clear cup ceased once
the jays were able to pick up the clear cup using the attached string in 10 out of 10 consecutive trials.
Individual subjects were then presented with a worm covered with an opaque red cup, whereby birds
were unable to see the food item inside the cup. Jays were trained until individuals had reached the
same acquisition criterion used during the clear cup training (i.e. 10 out of 10 consecutive trials).
One week prior to testing, we conducted food preference trials to determine individual preferences in
which we identified a preference rank for three commonly consumed food items, including waxworms,
peanuts and cubes of cheese (0.5 × 0.5 × 0.5 cm). Preference trials were tested across three sessions of 12
trials with an inter-test session interval of 24–48 h. In each session, subjects were offered each possible
combination of the different food items four times (i.e. waxworms versus peanut; waxworm versus
cheese; peanut versus cheese) and each trial was spaced approximately 30 s apart to allow the
individual to consume the chosen food item or store the item in its throat pouch. The experimenter
presented each combination of the different food items on a raised platform directly in front of the
perch approximately 150 mm apart and equidistant to the bird. The position of the food item (located
to the left or the right of the subject) was randomly switched but counter-balanced across each
session. The item that the subject initially approached was given to the bird and rated as the preferred
food item and the alternative food item was immediately removed by the experimenter. Individual
food preferences differed across subjects (table 1). The most preferred and second preferred food items
pertaining to each individual were subsequently used as their rewards during the magic-switch
experiment.
Table 1. Food preferences for each subject.












This experiment was inspired by the well-known magic routine cups-and-balls.2 Traditionally, the routine
involves three empty cups and three small balls with countless adaptations. Typically, a magician makes
the balls appear in random cups, disappear entirely or ‘magically’ transforms them into unexpected
items. In our adapted version of cups-and-balls, we used food items instead of balls and we used two
cups fitted with a piece of a string so that the birds could lift them using their beaks. Specifically, jays
were presented with two identical up-turned red cups on a raised platform directly in front of the
perch approximately 150 mm apart and equidistant to the bird. They were first presented with a
baiting process in one of the two cups and then the experimenter flipped both cups upside-down.
Subjects were subsequently able to uncover either cup to retrieve the hidden food reward (figure 1).
Subjects were presented with four different baiting conditions including two control conditions in
which the hidden food item was consistent with the birds’ expectations and two experimental
conditions in which the hidden food item was manipulated to violate the birds’ expectations. In control
1, the subject’s most preferred food item was baited in full view and the same food item subsequently
appeared when the subject uncovered the cup. In control 2, the subject’s second preferred food item
was baited in full view and the same food item subsequently appeared when the subject uncovered the
cup. In the up-value condition, the subject’s second preferred food item was bluff baited, but the most
preferred food item subsequently appeared when the subject uncovered the cup. This condition was
conducted to simulate a positive surprise. In the de-value condition, the subject’s most preferred food
item was bluff baited, but the second preferred food item subsequently appeared when the subject
uncovered the cup. This condition was conducted to simulate a negative surprise (figure 1).
Manipulations in the experimental trials were achieved by placing an unexpected food item inside
one of the two cups out of sight of the bird. The two cups were subsequently placed in front of the
subject and the bird was presented with the expected food item in the experimenter’s hand.
The experimenter then conducted a dummy-drop, whereby the expected food item was inserted
into the cup but instead of actually dropping it into the cup, it was concealed within the
experimenter’s fingers and subsequently withdrawn (figure 1). To ensure that the dummy-drop
technique was effectively deceiving the birds, we also conducted a subset of the control trials using
the same procedure. Specifically, out of sight of the bird, the expected food item was placed inside
one of the two cups, and then in full view of the bird, the experimenter used a dummy-drop to bluff
bait the same cup with the expected food item. We found no significant differences in the birds’
responses between the standard control trials and the subset of control trials that were completed
using the dummy-drop technique, and thus these data were pooled.
Testing sessions were completed across a period of 14 days. Subjects received between eight and 10
testing sessions comprised of up to 12 trials. Each session consisted of three trials of each of the four
conditions (i.e. control 1, control 2, up-value and de-value) presented in pseudo-randomized order to
ensure that they did not receive more than two trials of the same condition in successive order. This
was conducted to exclude the influence of negative and positive contrast effects. As participation was
voluntary, some subjects left the testing compartment prior to completing all 12 trials. When this
occurred, testing would then resume on the following day. For example, if a subject completed six
trials in a single session, the following day they would start the session on the seventh trial. In order
to prevent the subjects from developing a side bias, the placement of the food item was pseudo-
randomized across both cups but counter-balanced across each session so that the food item was2Other variations of this magic routine include ‘Chop Cup’ and the ‘Pea & Shell Game’.
Table 2. Dominance rank of our sample (N = 6 Eurasian jays).
subject dominant subordinate degree of dominance (%)
1. Homer Stuka, Dolci and Chinook — 50
2. Dolci Stuka, Poe and Jaylo Homer and Chinook 17
3. Stuka Jaylo and Chinook Dolci and Homer 0
4. Poe Chinook Dolci 0
5. Chinook Dolci Stuka and Poe −17




never inserted more than twice in a row into the same cup. Given that we were limited by resource
constraints, we maximized the number of trials per condition for each subject to help maintain
statistical power [45]. However, trials per condition did not exceed 25 since over-exposure to the cups-
and-balls routine in humans can improve perceptual performance [41]. Testing sessions were recorded
using a GoPro® Hero 6 video-camera and later analysed.Sci.8:2023582.5. Scoring social rank
We determined the social rank of each subject within our sample by conducting a series of observational
feeding sessions. The sessionswere carried out for 15 min everyweekday for four consecutiveweeks. Their
daily maintenance diet was placed in an elevated feeder where the subject sample could feed and interact
for 15 uninterruptedminuteswhile being recorded. Social interactionswere recorded using the same video
camera used for the testing procedure and later analysed. Dominant behaviourswere defined as aggressive
actions that were exhibited by one subject to another including chasing the other bird away from the
feeding platform, beak snapping and attacking. For a subject to be considered dominant over another
subject, the bird would have to exhibit a minimum of four dominant behaviours towards the
subordinate bird. Once all feeding sessions were analysed, we calculated an overall degree of





whereNd represents the total amount of dominance,Ns represents the total amount of subordinance and S
represents the subject sample. For example, our analysis of the feeding sessions demonstrated that Dolci
was dominant over three subjects (Stuka, Poe and Jaylo) and subordinate to two subjects (Homer and
Chinook) (DDP = (3 – 2/6) × 100%) giving her an overall dominance score of 17% (table 2).2.6. Data scoring and statistical analyses
All trials were analysed using the video recordings. We coded behaviours for a 30 s period for each trial
because trials were spaced approximately 30 s apart. The start of this period commenced the moment the
subject lifted the cup to uncover the food reward and ended after 30 s. We later reduced the scoring
period to 10 s because all subjects would either approach and consume the uncovered food item
within 10 s or outright reject the reward within this time period. Rejection occurred when the subject
would uncover the food reward but instead of retrieving it, the bird would leave the testing perch
and platform only to return once the rejected food reward was removed and the experimenter
motioned to the subject that a new trial was about to commence. We monitored specific behavioural
measurements including latency to consume and checking behaviour. We coded the latency to
consume the uncovered food reward by recording the number of seconds that elapsed from the
moment the subject lifted the baited cup to the moment when the subject retrieved the food reward.
Instances when the subject rejected the food reward were assigned a maximum latency of 10 s. We
also coded whether subjects re-checked the baited cup after the initial uncovering by either lifting it
again or looking inside the cup. Moreover, we coded whether subjects checked the alternative cup
after uncovering the baited cup.
Statistical analyseswere completedusing JASP (v. 0.10.2) andRStudio forMac (v. 1.2.1335). To assess inter-
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Figure 2. Responses to the four baiting conditions, N = 6 Eurasian jays. Boxplots depict (a) latencies to consume food item; (b) the
proportion of instances when subjects re-checked the baited cup; (c) the proportion of instances when subjects checked the





which included a balanced number of the four conditions. Reliability was excellent for latency to consume
(Cohen’s Kappa = 0.87), for re-checking the baited cup (Cohen’s Kappa: 0.90), for checking the alternative
cup (Cohen’s Kappa: 0.95), and for rejection of the uncovered food reward (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.96).
To investigate the influence of condition on the subjects’ latency to consume the food reward,
checking behaviour and reject behaviour, we conducted repeated-measures analyses. First, we checked
parametric assumptions using Shapiro–Wilks tests. Results revealed that our data were not normal
(latency: W = 0.620, p < 0.001; re-check: W = 0.332, p < 0.001; check other: W = 0.247, p < 0.001; reject:
W = 0.383, p < 0.001) (electronic supplementary material). We thus proceeded with non-parametric
permutation tests (aovperm function, permuco package). Significant differences were further explored
using pairwise permutation t tests with a Holm–Bonferroni adjustment to maintain the overall alpha
level at the nominated value of 0.05 for multiple pairwise comparisons (pairwise.perm.t.test function,
RVAideMemorie package). To investigate whether rejection behaviour was correlated with social rank,
we used a two-tailed Kendall’s tau correlation coefficient, which is appropriate for small samples (less
than 25) [50]. The variables in the correlation analysis included rejection rate and the degree of
dominance. Given that we had a limited sample size of six, we also examined these data to determine
the strength of the evidence in support of the alternative or the null hypothesis. To do this, we
calculated a Bayes factor using Bayesian Information Criteria [51], comparing the fit of the data under
the null and the alternative hypothesis (BF10 = alternative/null).3. Results
3.1. Latency to consume food
We measured the subjects’ latency to consume the food reward once they uncovered the red cup. Latency
to consume the food reward was significantly different across conditions (F3 = 117.50; p < 0.001). The de-
value condition that simulated a negative surprise elicited the strongest response in the jays, with
individuals exhibiting longer latencies to consume the uncovered food item compared with all other
conditions (all pholm < 0.001) (figure 2a). Latencies were also significantly different between the up-




8the food items were consistent with the birds’ expectations, subjects readily accepted the hidden food
item; and latencies to consume the most preferred food and second preferred food were comparable
( pholm = 0.085) (figure 2a).
3.2. Likelihood of re-checking the baited cup
We measured the subjects’ likelihood to re-check the cup after the initial uncovering. Re-checking was
significantly different across conditions (F3 = 91.98; p < 0.001). The jays were more likely to re-check the
baited cup after the initial uncovering in response to the de-value condition compared with both
control conditions (both pholm < 0.001) and compared with the up-value condition ( pholm < 0.01)
(figure 2b). Similarly, the jays were significantly more likely to re-check the baited cup in response to
the up-value condition compared with both controls (both pholm < 0.01). By contrast, the jays scarcely
re-checked the baited cup in response to control 1 and control 2 and re-checking behaviour was
comparable across both controls ( pholm = 0.994) (figure 2b).
3.3. Likelihood of checking the alternative cup
We measured the subjects’ likelihood to check under the alternative cup once they had uncovered the
baited cup. The subjects’ likelihood to check the alternative cup was significantly different across the
conditions (F3 = 18.96; p < 0.001). The jays were more likely to check the alternative cup in response to
the de-value condition compared with both control conditions (both pholm < 0.001) and compared with
the up-value condition ( pholm < 0.01) (figure 2c). Checking the alternative cup was rarely observed in
response to control 1, control 2 and the up-value condition, and this behaviour was comparable across
these three conditions (control 1–control 2: pholm = 1.00; control 1–up-value: pholm = 0.65; control 2–up-
value: pholm = 1.00) (figure 2c).
3.4. Rejection rate
To further investigate the discrepancy between the responses evoked by the positive and negative
surprise, we also measured whether any of the conditions in the adapted cups-and-balls routine
evoked rejection behaviour in the jays, whereby the subject would refuse to take the food item once
they uncovered the baited cup. Rejection was significantly different across the conditions (F3 = 52.49;
p < 0.001). We found that the jays were significantly more likely to reject the food item in response to
the de-value condition (average rejection = 46.67%) compared with all other conditions (all pholm <
0.001). Moreover, rejection of the food item did not occur in any of the other conditions (all pholm =
1.00) (figure 2d ).
3.5. Rejection rate and social rank
We found that subjects that exhibited a higher rejection rate tend to be more dominant. Specifically,
rejection rate in response to the de-value condition was significantly correlated with the degree of
dominance within our sample (Kendall’s tau B = 0.828, p < 0.05) (figure 3). This suggests that less
dominant jays were more likely to accept the de-valued food item, whereas more dominant jays were
more likely to reject the de-valued food item. To determine the strength of the evidence in favour of
there being a correlation, we also analysed the relationship between rejection behaviour and social
rank using a Bayesian correlation matrix. This analysis demonstrated that the strength of evidence is
moderate (BF10 = 4.178). The estimated Bayes factor indicates that our data were 4.178 times more
likely to be observed under the alternative hypothesis (i.e. significant correlation) than the null
hypothesis (i.e. no correlation).4. Discussion
Using an adapted cups-and-balls routine typically performed to humans, we demonstrate that jays are
sensitive to cognitive illusions. The response pattern to the different conditions in the adapted cups-
and-balls routine demonstrates that the birds were only sensitive to the value of the different food
items in the manipulation conditions when the hidden items violated their expectations. This suggests
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Figure 3. Rejection behaviour and social rank in N = 6 Eurasian jays. Relationship between the reject rate in response to the de-
value condition (N trials = 24 per subject) and the degree of dominance within our sample. The relationship is indicated by a two-
tailed Kendall’s tau correlation coefficient. Correlation analyses between the other conditions and social rank were not conducted
because rejection of the reward was only observed in the de-value condition, whereby the most preferred food item was magically





indeed sensitive to cognitive illusions. Within the context of caching, previous research has shown that
jays are sensitive to the content of their own caches and will discriminately retrieve items depending on
their food preferences and the perishability of the cached item [52,53]. Our study suggests that, as
observers, jays might impose the same content sensitivity when they pilfer the caches of others.
As predicted, the jays responded to both positive and negative surprises, which is evident from the
differences in latency and re-checking behaviour between the control and manipulated conditions, but
the jays were also sensitive to the type of cognitive illusion. Specifically, the jays tolerated the
cognitive illusion when it led to a more advantageous scenario (i.e. when the reward was more
valuable than expected) but rejected the hidden food items when they were less valuable than
expected (electronic supplementary material, video S1). This pattern of behaviour suggests that jays,
like some primates, respond asymmetrically to positive and negative events [54–57]. For example,
monkeys respond negatively when they expect an item of higher value (i.e. piece of banana) but
receive a less-valued food item (i.e. piece of lettuce) [24]. In humans, negative events tend to receive
more attention and can prompt increased cognitive processing compared with positive events [58–61].
This disparity has been investigated within the context of gains and losses and previous research has
demonstrated that humans can experience stronger emotional responses towards a loss as opposed to
a gain [62], a pattern consistent with loss aversion [63,64].
To put this into context, imagine you are approached by a magician who allures you with the promise
of gifting you the currency note that he holds in his hand. First, the magician holds out a £5 note for your
inspection and then proceeds to fold the note again and again until it resembles a tightly folded package.
The magician presents you with the package and asks you to unfold the note. You unfold the package to
reveal that the £5 note has ‘magically’ transformed into a £20 note, a positive surprise that generates a
sense of wonder and elation. Now consider that the magician had created the reverse effect and
‘magically’ transformed a £20 note into a £5 note, a negative surprise that might generate feelings of
dissatisfaction and frustration. In both scenarios, the cognitive illusion elicits a violation of
expectation, and the spectator uses the same amount of cognitive and physical effort to observe the
magic effect and unfold the note, respectively. However, the surprise aspect might vary in strength
and evoke considerably different responses depending on whether the cognitive illusion simulates a
loss or a gain.
Similar cognitive processes might be occurring in the jays. Indeed, despite using the same amount of
cognitive effort to track the hidden food item in the adapted cups-and-balls routine, the influence of the
jays’ losses (i.e. de-value) was greater than their gains (i.e. up-value). This is reflected in the increased
likelihood to re-check the baited cup and check the alternative cup in response to the de-value




10condition. However, this study alone cannot offer conclusive evidence that the magic-switch experiment
is exploiting similar cognitive mechanisms in jay observers to those that might be exploited in human
observers. Notice that we use an adapted version of the cups-and-balls effect and thus the experience
of the jays is likely going to differ from that of how humans might experience the traditional cups-
and-balls effect. Further research with comparative analyses are required to pinpoint the similarities
and differences between human and non-human observers when perceiving cognitive illusions.
Indeed, one recent study suggests that Eurasian jays have different expectations to humans when
observing cognitive illusions using sleight of hand techniques [65]. The study found that, similar to
humans, jays were deceived by cognitive illusions that used fast movements as a deceptive action. By
contrast, unlike humans, jays were not deceived by cognitive illusions that capitalized on the
observer’s expectations with respect to how human hands might manipulate hidden objects [65].
Consistent with our hypothesis, rejection was more prevalent in socially dominant subjects. Despite
our small sample size, the Bayes factor is indicative of at least moderate evidence supporting a correlation
between rejection rate and social rank and thus this area of research deserves further attention.
Nevertheless, consider the reported correlation statistics with caution since our limited sample size
could lead to an underpowered correlation analysis. Replications of the current study with a larger
sample size might highlight finer-grained analyses and could improve the evidential value of our
findings. Patterns between reward rejection and social rank might have ecological relevance because
less dominant individuals, who have less access to food resources, need to accept less favourable food
[66]. By contrast, more dominant individuals, who have greater access to optimal food resources, can
afford to be more discerning [67–69].
Taken together, our study demonstrates that observer jays remember the content of hidden food items
and this sensitivity is amplified if the cognitive illusion simulates a loss. This pattern suggests that
pilfering jays might be using a combination of cognitive abilities such as memory, imagining the
future and evaluating expectations to guide their decisions about whether to steal the caches of
others. Future research should focus on whether caching jays exploit the psychological constraints of
observing pilferers in order to evoke deceptive tactics involved in cache-protection. The application of
magical frameworks to comparative cognition unlocks alternative and innovative avenues for
investigating the animal mind. The focus of comparative cognition studies is usually centred on
investigating the evolution of analogous cognitive aptitude across species. However, the use of magic
effects provides researchers with an opportunity to look at the other side of the coin—the evolution of
analogous psychological constraints in diverse animal minds.
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